INTRODUCTION
ISO/IEC 15408, known as Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation, is an international standard that has been used as the basis for the evaluation of the security properties of IT products [1] [3] . Governmental organizations of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are part of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA). IT products that have been evaluated and authenticated based on CC will be approved in these 16 countries. These IT products will also have certifications that are accepted by 26 countries. As shown in Figure 1 , the number of IT products evaluated according to CC is growing rapidly.
ISO/IEC TR 19791 is an international standard that must be used as the basis for the security evaluation of operational systems [4] . The first version of this standard was made available in May 2006. ISO/IEC TR 19791 is intended to be compatible with ISO/IEC 15408, providing additional security evaluation criteria to address those aspects of operational systems not covered by the ISO/IEC 15408 evaluation criteria. In order to evaluate an IT product or system based on CC or ISO/IEC TR 19791, developers must create a Security Target (ST), or a System Security Target (SST). However, a problem encountered in creating an ST or SST is the determination of the Security Problem Definitions (SPDs), because the SPDs fall outside of the scope of CC. Neither ISO/IEC 15408 nor ISO/IEC TR 19791 provides a framework for risk analysis or the specification of threats. Usually, ST developers must refer to ISO/IEC 13335 for more detailed information [5] [9] .
In this paper, we propose a threat model based on multiple international standards and evaluated ST information, to be used for security specifications in the production of STs and SSTs which are to be evaluated by ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC TR 19791, respectively. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the International Standards used in this research. In Sections III and IV, we describe the issues motivating this research and the objectives we hope to achieve. In Sections V, VI and VII, we describe the three main steps in our approach: risk assessment, risk reduction and accreditation. In Section VIII we briefly describe a Web application that has been developed using our model. Finally, in Section IX, we present our conclusions and discuss future work.
II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND
In this section we present a brief review of CC.
A. ISO/IEC 15408 (CC)
As described above, CC is an international standard used as the basis for evaluating the security properties of IT products. CC Part 3 describes seven security requirements, called Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) [3] . As shown in Table I , about 90% of evaluated products have EAL1~EAL4 certification. An SST, as defined in ISO/IEC TR 19791, provides a specification for the implemented security capabilities of an operational system as it is employed in a specific operational context to counter assessed risk and enforce stated organizational security policies to achieve an acceptable level of residual risk.
The operational system is composed of an integrated combination of technical and operational control functions. The SST describes the requirements and behavior of the functions that implement the security objectives through a combination of technology-based and operation-based mechanisms.
An SST differs from an ST in that an SST focuses on the technical and operational controls of the operational systems. Each SST includes two parts: a common part applicable to the whole System Target of Evaluation (STOE) and a domain part, dealing with each security domain included in the STOE. The common part is made up of eight chapters as shown on the right hand side of Figure 2 .
C. Security problem definition
ISO/IEC 15408 provides a definition of the context in which the TOE resides. In particular, it defines the "Security Environment" which the TOE is designed to address. This description details any assumptions defining the scope of the security needs, the identified threats to the assets requiring protection, and any organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply.
III. RESEARCH ISSUES
Based on ISO/IEC TR 19791, the SST security problem definition needs to provide a coherent, consistent and sufficiently complete definition of the security problems that the operational system is intended to address. The security problems are stated in terms of the risks that will be countered by the operational system and the organizational security policies that support and govern the use of the operational system to reduce operational system risk to an acceptable level.
One of the problems in creating an ST is to determine the SPDs, because they fall outside of the scope of CC. When evaluating a system against ISO/IEC 19791, this problem becomes more complex because, to determine the SPDs in this case, the SST must also address the establishment of acceptable risk and the determination of actual residual risk. However, ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC TR 19791 do not provide a framework for risk analysis or the specification of threats. The ST developer must, therefore, refer to other standards.
Another problem is in the area of knowledge required in creating an ST or SST. There is a large amount of information to digest. In addition, according to CC, the subject of criteria for the assessment of the inherent qualities of cryptographic algorithms is not covered in the CC. However, the TOE may employ cryptographic functionality to help to satisfy several high-level security objectives. In this case, ST developers must be able to refer to external standards, such as particular cryptographic standards or protocols.
IV. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This research was motivated by a desire to help ST and SST developers to indentify and specify the threats that affect the TOE and its environment.
Following on from a previous study [10] , this paper proposes a threat model based on international standards to be used for security specification of security evaluation by CC and ISO/IEC 19791. The objective is to support developers to describe the SPDs. In addition, this threat model will allow developers to determine the level of risk which the organization is willing to accept [11] .
ISO/IEC 19791, describes a three-step approach to establishing the necessary level of security for an operational system:
• Step1: Risk assessment
These three steps will be considered in the next three sections.
V. RISK ASSESSMENT
To implement the risk assessment, it is necessary to determinate the assets that need protection. In this research we implement the asset classification of ISO/IEC 27001.
The risk assessment is also necessary to identify a proposed course of action to reduce the risk to an acceptable level by implementing the security controls from ISO/IEC 19791.
Each risk is categorized as tolerated, accepted, avoided, transferred, or unacceptable, that is, requiring reduction or elimination through technical or operational controls within the STOE.
The list of risks includes risks relating to the development of the operational system. The description of each risk needs to be sufficiently detailed to identify the assets that can be damaged or compromised, the threats and vulnerabilities applicable to each asset and the impact of a successful attack.
Attacks can have several objectives, including fraud, extortion, theft of information, revenge or simply the challenge of penetrating a system. Attacks can be performed by internal employees who abuse their permissions of access, or by external attackers who break in remotely or intercept network traffic.
The majority of successful attacks on operational systems are linked to only a few vulnerable software applications. This can be attributed to the fact that attackers are opportunistic. They take the easiest and most convenient route, and exploit the best-known flaws with the most effective and widely available attack tools. They often attack indiscriminately, scanning the Internet for any vulnerable systems.
In the former model [10] threats are classified in terms of WHO, HOW and WHAT. As shown in Figure 3 , this new model also includes WHY, WHEN and WHERE to simplify the study of the large-scale environment and to help developers to describe SPDs for security evaluation by ISO/IEC 19791. It also includes asset value modeling and risk management based on ISO/IEC 13335. To create this new model, we have been working with 170 SPD for STs evaluated by CC. We classified the threats included in evaluated STs, according to this new threat model.
A. Classification of Threat Information
At first, the attacks we examined involved little technical sophistication: Insiders used their permissions to alter archives or registries; outsiders tried to find a single valid password for a network.
Through the years, more and more sophisticated forms of attack have been developed that utilize "holes" discovered in the design, configuration and operation of the systems. These new methods allow attackers to take control of entire systems, producing true disasters that can cause massive damage to organizations or companies with the highest degree of technological dependency.
These new methods of attack have been automated and, in many cases, only basic technical knowledge is needed to perform them. The novice intruder now has access to numerous programs and scripts on "hacker" bulletin boards and Web sites, where additional instructions on how to execute attacks with the tools are available.
To identify and specify an SPD, it is necessary to know the following:
• Who is the person posing a threat? (WHO)
• How is the attack implemented? (HOW)
• What is the object exposed to the threat? (WHAT)
• Where is the attacker located? (WHERE)
• When does the attack take place? (WHEN)
• Why did the attack happened? (WHY)
1) WHO
Threat agents can be classified by two parameters: the type of agent and the agent's level of authentication. Based on ISO/IEC 15446 [12] we can classify threat agents which have the potential to access resources and to cause harm in terms of agent types, such as a person, a place, or a thing that (see Figure 4 ). In our model, the first parameter has 2 values: human and other.
Human threats subsequently can be broken down according to authentication level, such as system administrator, authorized user or unauthorized user. In our model, this second parameter defines the agent as authenticated, unauthenticated or undefined.
2) WHAT
ISO/IEC 15408 defines an asset as information or a resource that may be protected by the security policy. In this research, as shown in Figure 5 , to define WHAT we classified the results of attacks in terms of loss types: availability, confidentiality, and integrity. In addition, it is necessary to specify the assets that we must to protect, because the attack may affect IT capabilities, as in a system or a user process. The first parameter classifies the results of attacks in terms of loss types: availability, confidentiality, integrity.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is the protection of communications or the data stored against interception and unauthorized reading by people. Confidentiality is necessary for the transmission of sensitive data and is one of the main requirements addressing the disquiet of users concerning privacy in communication networks.
Integrity: Integrity is confirmation that the data have been sent, received or stored completely, and that the information has not been modified. Integrity is especially important in relation to authentication for the conclusion of contracts or in the cases in which the accuracy of the data is critical.
Availability: This means that the data are accessible, even when alterations, natural power failures, catastrophes, accidents or attacks happen. This characteristic is particularly important when a failure of the network can cause interruptions or chain reactions that affect the operations of the company.
The second parameter shows the assets that we must to protect, such as a hard disk, display data or printed data.
3) WHERE
As shown in Figure 6 , to specify this parameter, it is necessary to know the location of the threat agent attacking the system. In addition, it is necessary to explain whether the attack affects the system directly or affects the system environment. 
4) WHEN
To specify this parameter is necessary to know when the attack took place. For example, the time and the day need to known.
According ISO/IEC 19791 security evaluation, the security controls of an operational system must be assessed throughout the lifetime of the system. Therefore, it is also necessary to classify the attack according to the lifecycle phase. The lifecycle of an operational system is considered to have four phases: development/integration, installation, system operation and maintenance.
5) WHY
This classification is used to evaluate the attitude of some agents. We can, for example, identify the motivation of the agent attacking the system as malicious or non-malicious. Malicious attacks usually come from external people or disgruntled current or ex-employees who have specific goals or objectives to achieve.
6) HOW
The methods of attack can be divided into general categories that are related to each other, since the use of a method in a category allows the use of other methods in other categories. For example, after cracking one password, an intruder can log in like a legitimate user to view the archives and exploit vulnerabilities of the system. Some frequently used techniques for acquiring information are listed below.
• Eavesdropping and packet sniffing The asset value, the threat and vulnerability levels, relevant to each impact type, can be matched in a matrix, as shown in Figure 8 . 
A. Security Controls in ISO/IEC 15408 1) Security Functional Requirements
ISO/IEC 15408 Part 2 establishes a set of security functional components as a standard way of expressing the security functional requirements for TOEs. Security functional requirements are grouped into classes. Classes are the most general grouping of security requirements, and all members of a class share a common focus.
The members of a Class are called "Families". They are a set of security requirements that share security objectives. Finally, the members of Families are called "Components". These describe a specific set of security requirements and are the smallest selectable sets of security requirements for inclusion in the ST for evaluation.
Eleven functionality classes are contained within Part 2 of the CC. These classes are summarized in Table II . 2) Security Assurance Requirements ISO/IEC 15408 Part 3 establishes a set of assurance components to be used as standard templates to meet security assurance requirements (SARs) for TOEs. The security assurance requirements are catalogued and organized in Class and Families. In addition, this part also defines the evaluation criteria for protection profile (PP) and ST. There are seven predefined assurance packages, usually called Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs). Table III show the SARs, and the number of family and components in each class. 
B. Security Control in ISO/IEC 19791
In ISO/IEC 15408, the evaluation of security functionality deals only on the provision of IT security functions. However, for ISO/IEC 19791, an operational system is generalized into an STOE that includes both the technical and operational control functions. Technical security controls are selected from the functional classes defined within ISO/IEC 15408-2 but ISO/IEC 19791 defines extensions to ISO/IEC 15408 to enable the security assessment of operational systems. Security functional requirements are grouped into classes. Classes are the most general grouping of security requirements, and all members of a class share a common focus. These classes are summarized in Table IV.   TABLE IV. OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONTROL
Operational security controls Family
Administration control (FOD) 6
IT System control (FOS) 7
User Assets control (FOA) 2
Business control (FOB) 2
Facility and Equipment control (FOP) 5
Third Parties control (FOT) 2
C. Security Controls in ISO/IEC 27002
ISO/IEC 27002 contains eleven security control clauses. Each clause contains a number of security categories. Finally, these security categories include a control objective and one or more controls. Table V shows the eleven clauses together with the number of main security categories and the number of security control within each clause.
Our proposed knowledge-base includes these 11 clauses, 39 security categories, and 133 security controls. However, there are many relationships between these security controls and it may be necessary to ignore some of these in practice. 
D. Security Control in ISO/IEC 13335
To select countermeasures according to this threat classification, we also include in our knowledge-base information from ISO/IEC 13335, in particular guidance on the selection of safeguards from Part 4. Table VI shows safeguards for confidentiality and Table  VII shows the references to possible security controls for losses of confidentiality given in ISO/IEC 13335. 
E. Security Control in FIPS 140-2
Federal information processing standards publication FIPS PUB 140-2 specifies the security requirements that are to be satisfied by cryptographic modules [13] . This standard also provides 4 levels of security. As shown in Table VIII, the 11 security requirement areas are defined to the secure of design and implementation of cryptographic modules.
There is a set of assertions for each security requirement. The number of assertions is increased according to the security level. In addition, following each assertion is a set of requirements levied on the vendor, and a set of requirements levied on the tester. FIPS 140-2 consists of approximately 80 pages. However, our proposed knowledge base will work as a Web application allowing users to find easily and quickly the necessary security requirements and related cryptographic terms inside FIPS 140-2 and other standards. In particular, it includes information from the Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2, and this document provided by NIST will be used by accredited laboratories to test whether the cryptographic module conforms to the requirements of FIPS 140-2.
VII. ACCREDITATION
This is the last step to establishing operational system security. In this step is necessary to confirm that the residual risks remaining within the system after the controls are applied are appropriate for the system to be used in live operation.
However, ISO/IEC TR 19791 does not provide techniques or models for accreditation. In this research we have implemented a Risk Management Framework (RMF) based on NIST SP 800-37 [14] . Figure 9 shows the tasks required to apply the Risk Management Framework to information systems. Using on the threat classification described in Section V, the authors have been working to create an application to be used as a knowledge base for the identification and specification of the threats that affect an STOE under evaluation.
In the SPD section of the SST, the SST developer must describe the security problems to be addressed by the TOE, the operational environment of the TOE, and the development environment of the TOE.
The knowledge-base application was created to support SST developers. This tool provides access to information about threats that affect an STOE. Developers can search for threats by selecting some parameters. In addition, the threats have been classified into five categories: system administrator, authorized user, physical environment, systems hardware, and malicious unauthorized individual.
ST developers can select the appropriate threat from the knowledge base. SST developers are also able to select WHO poses a threat, HOW the attack is implemented, WHAT object is exposed to the threat, WHERE the attacker is located, WHEN the attack takes place, and WHY the attack occurs.
Our knowledge base also includes a list of security policies based on international standards, including ISO/IEC 15408. After having defined the security objectives in response to the identified threats, it is necessary to elaborate on how these security objectives should be met. This is accomplished by selecting an appropriate set of Systems Functional Requirements (SFRs) and SARs.
For example, suppose an authorized user improperly collects sensitive or security-critical data. More specifically, the user collects residual data from public objects.
The threat can be classified by the following criteria. 
